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­cializes in short story
 and narrative theory
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fiction.




 particularly good movement  
with 
a
 similarly valuable case, so it may  
happen with jokes that the best achieve
­ments in the way of jokes are used as an
 envelope for thoughts of the greatest
 substance.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to
 
the Unconscious
A minor literature doesn’t come from a
 
minor language; it 
is
 rather that which a  
minority constructs within 
a
 major lan ­
guage.
—Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka:
 
Toward a Minor Literature
1.
The charge that the short story is a “major” form
 
belies the fact that it continues to be studied 
as
 a  
“minor” genre. It 
is
 curious that in this age of theo ­
ry and practice the short story remains one of the
 most theoretically “deterritorialized” narrative genres.
 Though many critics and students of the genre
 
would  
vehemently protest against its “minor” or “marginal”
 status, it nevertheless remains a fact that, with one or
 two exceptions, no extensive study of the short story
 as either a narratively major or minor form is cur
­rently in print. Regardless of the reasons why such an
 obvious lack of critical attention to the short story
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ertheless appears to mitigate against the popularity of the short story as a seri
­
ous venue for many fiction writers. The present essay seeks to some extent to
 offer an explanation of the genre’s “minor” status among critics while remain-
 ing one of
 
the most “seriously playful” forms within which many current and  
past “major” writers create.
Though it would be impossible, in the short scope of this essay, to offer a .
 
theoretical framework for discussing the major versus minor status of the short
 story in general, by examining a few examples of the subgenre of the short
­short story in light of Deleuze and Guattari’s first qualification of a minor lit
­erature — that it bears a “high coefficient of deterritorialization” — it becomes
 possible to understand how the short story has managed to retain its major sta
­tus among writers while at the same time remaining a critically
 
marginal genre.  
Moreover, by considering the genre and its subsidiary forms in light of Freud’s
 work on the tendentious
 
joke as an example of a “minor” narrative genre, some  
light 
is
 shed not only on the narrative functions of short-short stories but also  
on the question of how major versus minor literary status is conferred upon a
 popular yet marginal form that to some extent depends on its marginal status
 to retain its major effect.
Deleuze and Guattari describe three characteristics of a minor literature: 1)
 
the deterritorialization of language, 2) the connection of an individual to a
 political immediacy, and 3) a collective assemblage of enunciation (18). In
 order to adapt the concept of minor literature to a study of a genre within a
 major language, this essay will focus on describing and evaluating the deterri
­torialization of a genre: the short-short story. By deterritorialization of genre
 is meant the way in which a genre — in this case the short-short story — acts
 
as
 a passage point into “territory” not usually seen as territory the genre usual ­
ly occupies. In this case, the deterritorialization of genre signifies a space of
 freedom, a territory of genre wherein experiment and inversion take place in
 spite of the rigid controls of generic convention. Freud’s work on the genre of
 the joke in his Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious
 
will likewise be adapt ­
ed to demonstrate first the similarity between the narrative operations of the
 joke and the short-short story, and second how these generic similarities are
 operative
 
within the short-short subgenre. Short-short stories by  Kafka, Petro-  
nious, Colette, and Woolf
 
have been chosen to examine generic deterritorial ­




the short story and the joke has not  gone unremarked  
by critics of the short story. Walter Allen, in his The Short Story in
 
English, cites  
the
 
joke as the present-day survivor of the oral tale and notes that “[v]ery few  
jokes, written down, would seem much Eke modern stories. They might very
 well, though, remind us of many of Boccacio’s tales in skeleton form. This
 throws light on the relationship of the modern story both to the joke and to
 tales of
 
earlier times” (4). Although Allen does not examine this relationship  
and implies that it is one in which dissimilarities dominate, at least one short
­
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story critic, Clare Hanson, notes that the short-story writer Saki “frequently
 
uses the frame of the practical joke for the purpose of unmasking, revealing
 something hidden beneath the surface of life” (47). Hanson adds that the plea
­sure this unmasking yields in Saki
'
s stories is connected to the workings of the  
unconscious in the same way as in the joke. According to Freud:
A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a notion that has
 
occurred to us “involuntarily.” What happens is not that we know a
 moment beforehand what joke we are going to make, and that all it needs
 
is
 to be clothed in words. We have an indefinable feeling, rather, which I  
can best compare with an “absence” a sudden release of intellectual tension,
 and then all at once the joke is there as a rule ready-clothed in words.
(Jokes
 167)
We shall return to the crucial role that “absence” plays in both the joke para
­
digm and the short-short, but for now it is enough to note that Hanson’s use of
 Freud’s formula constitutes the only specific correlation that has been made to
 date between the short story and Freud’s text. Furthermore, in regard to short
 stories with “trick” or surprise endings (such as those written by both Saki and
 O. Henry), Hanson perceptively situates the reader in the position of the “lis
­tener,” or necessary third person, in Freud’s tendentious joke paradigm (47).
Hanson’s use of Freud signals a formal recognition of the connection
 
between the short story and the joke, but it also presents a veiled threat to the
 critical status of the short story. For although both Saki and O. Henry are
 admittedly “major” short story writers,
 
both have been accused of being “minor”  
artists for having written in the highly formulaic, technically prefabricated style
 for which they are known. Their works have often been cited 
as
 examples of  
what the short-story genre can be reduced to in the hands of “sensationalists,”
 and the beginning writer is admonished not to imitate their methods. In addi
­tion, though they are both considered to be “short-story writers,” it is in the
 subgenre of the short-short that some of their most memorable work has been
 done.
Paradoxically, it is precisely because their short-short stories (O. Henry’s
 
“The Gift of the Magi” and Saki’s “The Open Window,” for example) are so
 closely related to the joke paradigm that their effects as stories are ensured and
 the writers’ reputations so tarnished. Does this then mean that a study of the
 short-short by way of the structure of jokes will “short-circuit” at the outset,
 will amount only to a catalogue of the gimmickry at the writer’s disposal and
 therefore an implicit admission that the short story is, after all, a
 
“minor” genre?
At least two factors guard against this outcome. First, not all short-shorts
 are as transparently
 
related to the joke paradigm as those of Saki and O. Henry.  
Second, the joke-work itself, 
as
 articulated by Freud, is not as easily appropri ­
ated as it may seem. After all, there are “good” jokes and “bad” jokes, success
­fully and unsuccessfully told ones. As Freud notes, the defining characteristic
 of what constitutes a joke 
is
 elusive and lies not simply in the joke technique  
nor in the pleasure that the joke affords its creator Jokes 145). Furthermore,
 “the joke-work is not at everyone’s command, and altogether only a few people
3
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have a plentiful amount of it; and these are distinguished by being spoken of as
 
having wit’” (140). In this regard the successful joker is not unlike the creative
 writer, as for both the success of their craft originates in play with words and
 partakes of the workings of the unconscious as it also manifests itself in the
 dreamwork (170). As for jokes themselves, they have a “subjective determi
­nant” that indicates that
[o]nly
 
what I allow to be a joke is a joke. What is a joke to me may mere ­
ly be a comic story to other people. But if a joke admits of this doubt, the
 reason can only
 
be that it has a facade — in these instances a comic one —  
in the contemplation of which one person is satiated
 
while another may  try  
to peer behind it. A suspicion may arise, moreover, that this facade 
is intended to dazzle the examining eye and that these stories have therefore
 something to conceal.
(105-6)
Furthermore, by not being at the disposal of all tellers, the joke becomes a high
­
ly deterritorialized genre, one that
 
by its own nature is inherently removed from  
the language in which it 
is
 told.
What Freud suggests here is that the joke — any joke — 
is
 paradigmatic.  
The joke itself is an “envelope” for a thought that would otherwise not be
 expressed (92). In other words, “the substance of a joke is independent of the
 joke and 
is
 the substance of  the thought, which is here, by means of a special  
arrangement, expressed as a joke.” The “special arrangement” — the
 
joke par ­
adigm — involves three people: the “first person” (teller), the “second person”
 (object of the joke), and the “third person” (the listener). In textual terms we
 can revise this paradigm in any one of several ways: 
1)
 first person/writer, sec ­
ond person/text, third person/reader; or 2) first person/narrator, second per-
 son/narrated, third person/narratee; or 3) first person/reader, second person
 text, third person/context. Each revision corresponds to and overlaps with cer
­tain theories of textual production: intentionality and reader response, textual
 hermeneutics, and Marxist/materialist theories of the cultural production of
 textual identity. By superimposing the joke paradigm we can establish a psy
­choanalytic criticism that can incorporate, rather than be reduced to, a diversi
­ty of critical approaches to textuality (Brooks 112).
Thus we find that at least two factors safeguard a study of the correlation
 
between the short-short and the joke against a reductivist cataloguing of tech
­niques: jokes themselves cannot be reduced to such a catalogue; and they pos
­sess a “subjective determinant” that implicates both creator and listener in the
 process of construction and deterritorializes the genre. Thus the rich potential
 of the joke paradigm enables us to discuss the short-short 
as
 itself a facade that  
“dazzles” and “conceals,” a facade that the writer “exposes” and that we as read
­ers “try to peer behind.” Jokes and short-shorts, mutually reliant upon brevity
 and economy to achieve their effect, share Freud’s requirement for abbreviation
 (Jokes 42).
  The technique of using brevity, as Freud noted in his connection with the
 seminal joke borrowed from Heinrich Heine, is related to other techniques
 
4





 condensation, multiple use of the same material, and double meaning.  
Freud notes that the element common to these techniques is "a question of
 economy” (42). But
not every economy of expression, not every abbreviation, 
is
 on that account  
a joke as well. . . . There must be some peculiar kind of abbreviation and
 economy on which the characteristic of being a joke depends; and until we
 know the nature of
 
that peculiarity our discovery of  the common element  
in the techniques of jokes brings us no nearer to a solution of our problem.
 
(20)
The problem Freud refers to is that of discovering the psychical process that
 
characterizes both the production of jokes in the first person and the pleasure
 they produce in the listener. As regards the listener, Freud writes, "laughter
 arises if a quota of psychical energy which has earlier been used for the cathexis
 of particular psychical paths has become unusable, so that it can find free dis
­charge” (Jokes 147). The joke thus “lifts” the inhibitory cathexis in the listen
­
er.
 But the creator of the joke is barred from participating in this same psychic  
process if the joke is to succeed — nothing ruins a joke more readily than if the
 joker begins laughing in the process of telling the joke. Therefore, the psychi
­cal process the creator undergoes differs from that of the listener. In his char
­acteristically dualistic fashion, Freud offers two explanations for the process: 1)
 no inhibitory cathexsis is lifted for the listener, or 2) there 
is
 an “interference”  
with the possibility of discharge that may arise from the application of the lib
­erated cathectic energy to some other endopsychic use. The teller of the
 
joke,  
in telling it, produces the force that lifts an inhibition
 
by  economizing a psychic  
expenditure of energy within the joke itself, thus clearing the way for the lis
­tener, who brings little or no psychic investment to the joke, to receive its plea
­sure.
Jokes, like dreams, are “overdetermined” according to Freud. Both employ
 
the processes of displacement, condensation, and indirect representation. In
 both jokes and dreams, brevity results in condensation. Clearly, the literary
 genre of the short-short story shares with both the joke and the dream this
 reliance upon condensation through brevity to achieve its effect. However,
 short-shorts require, as do jokes, a listener actively engaged in the textual
 process.
Brevity, in both jokes and short-short stories, serves the purposes of com
­
munication: a joker, like a writer, must “capture”
 
the listener in a relatively  short  
period of time. Jokes are short both because there is not much time in which
 to tell them and because, owing to the nature of their dynamic, they accentuate
 the ephemerality of perception. Short-shorts, as imitations of the joking
 process, duplicate the joke’s advantage of brevity and are thus aligned with the
 “economy of psychical expenditure” offered by the joke.
In order to trace more closely the thread weaving Freud’s discussion of
 
economy in the joke with that of economy, or brevity, in the short-short, it 
is helpful to subject Freud’s analysis to 
a
 type of “secondary revision” by consider ­
ing it in light of a story by Franz Kafka. Because the story, “Absent-Minded
5
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 is so short, it is possible to reproduce it here in English  
translation.
Absent-Minded Window Gazing
What are we to do with these spring days that are now fast coming on?
 
Early this morning the sky was gray, but if you go to the window now you
 are surprised and lean your cheek against the latch of the casement.
The sun 
is
 already setting, but down below you see it lighting up the  
face of the little girl who strolls along looking about her, and at the same
 time you see her eclipsed by the shadow of the man behind overtaking her.
And then the man has passed by
 
and the little girl’s face is quite bright.
(Kafka 387)
Revision of Freud’s analysis here involves substituting the “first person” of the
 
narrative for the “first person” of the joke. We will temporarily bypass the
 authorial position and triangulate the text into narrator, narrated, and narratee:
 we will make use, in other words, of our second revision of the joke paradigm.
 In doing this we find that the narrator is itself split into the “we” of the first
 line and the “you” of the end of the first paragraph. At the same time, the nar
­ratee stands outside the text, in the third-person position, 
as
 listener to a text  
that is simultaneously implicating the reader and constructing the reader as
 Other. In this way, the first revision of Freud’s paradigm is superimposed onto
 the second.
In this superimposition, the “second person” of the joke/text is the narrat
­
ed: the setting of the window, the sun setting, the girl, the man, the act of
 eclipsing, the brightening of the girl’s face, and so on. . In the second revision,
 the “second person” is the text, including the narrator, the narrated, and the nar

















In the second paragraph of Kafka’s story, the “first person” we/you conjures
 
the inhibition that is to be lifted by putting the “third person” you/reader in
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sympathy with the young girl walking in the sun. Thus when the shadow of the
 
man eclipses her, the you/reader’s inhibition against the ominousness of this act
 
is
 lifted by a narrative sleight of hand — it is only his shadow that comes into  
contact with her face. But his threatening potential as abductor or molester 
is alluded to by his approach from “behind overtaking her.” The last line lifts the
 inhibition, passing over the you/reader as the shadow passes over the girl’s face;
 like the girl’s face, the you/reader is psychically left “quite bright” as well. At
 the same time, because the reader as “you” is implicated in the process of con
­structing the joke/text, the we/you “economizes” the lifting of the inhibition by
 emphasizing the mutual construction of the narrative itself, thus crediting the
 reader with the creation of the text/joke s/he also receives.
Kafka’s peculiar use of both the third-person plural and second-person uni
­
versal pronoun makes the story especially well-suited to a revision of Freud’s
 analysis. Because the pronoun chain allows the reader to participate in both the
 first- and third- person positions of the joke paradigm, the “economy of
 
psy ­
chical expenditure” flows continuously through the narrative. The economic
 chain of the story is interrupted only by the reader’s position outside the text,
 by her awareness of herself as being in the position of listener. Once the read
­er disengages from the narrative, she finds herself in the same position as that
 of the third person; that is, the story can now be retold and passed on to the
 next listener.
This story originates in a textually preconscious “thought”: “spring is as
 
fresh and vulnerable to change as a young girl alone on a street.” Given over to
unconscious revision, the “vulnerable to change” manifests itself as the man’s
 shadow overtaking the girl. The season’s vulnerability is displaced to the shad
­ow’s eclipse of the girl, whose brightened face restores triumph to spring’s abil
­ity to overcome changing weather. The story makes use of joke techniques such
 as displacement, allusion, condensation and substitution. And both the we/you
 and the you/reader participate in the “economy of psychical expenditure”
 offered by the joke paradigm and set into motion by Kafka’s shift in point of
 view from the first-person plural to the second-person “you,” which can be
 taken as either singular or plural or both and so completes the circularity of the
 joke chain.
The success of the story, and the success of a joke, depends on the reader’s
 
having been “captured” by the punch line, or moment of closure. There is a
 marked similarity between the success of a joke as described by Freud — hid
­den similarities are revealed between dissimilar things, sense emerges out of
 nonsense, bewilderment yields to illumination — and the success of a short
­short. Irving Howe agrees that in the short-short, “[everything depends on
 intensity, one sweeping blow of perception” (xi).
In the joke the liberated cathectic energy finds its release, for the listener,
 
in laughter. Though Kafka’s story is not “funny”
 
in this sense, the release of psy ­
chical energy experienced in the moment of closure constitutes a type of Kris-
 tevan “laughter of the text” on the part of the reader. In fact, a revision of the
 tendentious joke paradigm in terms of what Freud calls “woman’s inflexibility”
 (the first condition of smut according to Freud) is itself a type of “motor dis
­charge,” an expenditure that places woman simultaneously in the subject and
7
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object position and allows her access to the joking chain as the “first person,” or
 
teller of the joke (Kristeva 224-5).
Brevity and psychical expenditure, or closure, then, are two Freudian char
­
acteristics shared by the joke and the short-short. The third quality, absence,
 what Freud calls a “sudden release of intellectual
 
tension,” is, in the short-short,  
precisely the nature of the creative condition. The writer, as Freud notes in his
 essay on daydreaming and creativity, must occupy a place of absence in order to
 create. In Kafka’s story, this connection 
is
 underscored by the title itself:  
“Absent-Minded Window Gazing.”
That short-shorts depend not only on brevity and closure but also on the
 
presence of an absence is substantiated by the work of
 
any number of writers.  
For instance, in O. Henry’s story, “The Gift of the Magi,” the success of the
 ending turns on this play between presence and absence in the “presents” the
 couple “present” each other with at Christmas: both gifts are purchased at the
 price of the very thing that the other sacrificed for. The girl sells her hair to
 buy the boy a watch fob; the boy sells his watch to buy a comb for the girl’s hair.
In Petronius’s story, “The Wife of Ephesus,” the soldier attempting to
 
seduce the wife faithfully mourning her dead husband wins his aim by cajoling
 her with the presentation of a meal as a substitute for the absence of her hus
­band. Death, he declared to her, 
is
 the common end and last home of all men,  
enlarging on this and other commonplaces generally employed to console a
 wounded spirit (262). The absence of the crucified body of
 
a criminal (which  
the soldier had been entrusted to guard) that was stolen while he seduced the
 wife 
is
 what prompts her to offer her husband’s body as a substitute for the  
missing body of the criminal in order that the negligent soldier not be execut
­ed for failing his duty. It is this action, on the part of the wife, that effectively
 moves her, as woman, from the position of object, or “butt,” of the seduction
 joke into the subject position, as a third-person listener becomes the first-per
­son teller of her own joke. The punch line of this textual
 
joke coincides with  
the moment of closure in the story:
“The gods forbid,” she cried, “I should at one and the same time look on
 
the corpses of two men, both most dear to me. I had rather hang a dead
 man on the cross than kill a living one.” So said, so done; she orders her
 husband’s body to be taken from its coffin and fixed upon the vacant cross.
 The soldier availed himself of
 
the ready-witted lady’s expedient, and next  
day all men marvelled how in the world a dead man had found his way to
 the cross.
(Petronius 265)
The wife’s action, as well as her response to the seduction, has earned her the
 
reputation as the paradigmatic “fickle woman.” A revision of the story by
 means of the joke paradigm reveals the wife of Ephesus as the heroine of her
 own seduction: society would deny her, in her widowhood, any sexual satisfac
­tion, yet she plays society’s “rules” against themselves to take control of her own
 future. In short, within a deterritorialized genre, the wife succeeds in deterri
­torializing society’s expectations concerning her.
8




Only jokes with 
a
 purpose run the risk of meeting with people who don’t want  
to listen to them.
—Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious
Tendentious jokes, according to Freud, serve an aim, and “where a joke 
is
 not  
an aim in itself there are only two purposes that it may serve. . . . [I]t is either
 a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness, satire or defense) or an
 obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure) (Jokes 97). For woman in the
 position of object, or “butt,” of the joke, purposes of hostility and obscenity are
 necessarily conflated: in either case, woman is to be “kept in her place” within
 the scheme of male domination. Feminist critics working with Freudian texts
 often find that Freud himself provides the paradigm that allows woman access
 to the subject position in the textual/joking chain. As Jerry Aline Flieger pro
­poses, “'she,’ however offended by the male conspirators, refuses to leave the
 room feeling ashamed” (960).
According to Freud, it 
is
 “woman's inflexibility,” her  refusal to yield to man’s  
attempts at sexual exposure, that constitutes the “first condition” for the devel
­opment of the obscene joke. Thus, woman is simultaneously the inhibition
 underlying the joke and the source of cathectic liberation once this inhibition
 is lifted. In other words, in her “inflexibility” woman has access to all three
 positions on the joking chain. Her inflexibility is itself a superimposition of the
 three stages of the psychical process of the joke: 1) the inflexibility that renders
 woman unwilling to acknowledge herself 
as
 the butt of the joke reenacts the  
first-person position, in which the teller is unable to laugh at the joke in the
 telling of it; 2) that inflexibility is also the “absence” from which the joke aris
­
es
 involuntarily; and 3) inflexibility, whether a matter of attitude or of the lit ­
eral stiffening of the body, is itself a “cathectic response,” a “motor discharge”
 (albeit nonhysterical) that aligns woman with the third-person position on the
 joking chain, that of the listener whose inhibitions are lifted by the joke.
Moreover, in Freudian terms, “woman’s incapacity to tolerate undisguised
 
sexuality” is nothing less than her refusal to have exposed as her sexuality the
 pseudo-sexuality of herself as “castrated man” constructed out of man’s own
 refusal to tolerate his homoerotic nature. The obstacle to man’s desire, in other
 words, is not woman but man’s own inhibitions regarding his homoerotic
 nature. Woman in the tendentious joke paradigm serves as the displaced object
 of man’s “desire” for the company of his own, not the Other’s, company. Her
 refusal to allow herself to be used this way (evidenced by her own cathectic
 response of not laughing at the obscene joke) is a powerful deterritorialization
 both of herself and of the joking chain to which she would be denied entrance.
Thus, woman, who through her refusal to participate in the joke with the
 
same type of cathectic response as men finds access to the joking chain,
 becomes the Medusa who laughs, rightly, at man, who in his own homophobic
 fear insists that woman herself cannot be looked upon directly. The short-short
 story, so closely related to the paradigm of the joke, enables women writing to
 overdetermine themselves as subjects and to gain direct access to the power of
 the punch line in such a way as to “ex-pose” themselves as beyond male ridicule.
9
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For instance, in Colettes “The Hidden Woman” (“La Femme Cache”) the
 
figure of the male doctor finds himself simultaneously exposed to woman’s
 repressed desire and liberated by the free expression of that desire through a
 double-edged
 
joke that the doctor and his wife each play on each other. Both  
the doctor and the wife tell each other that they won’t be going to the green and
 purple masked ball: the doctor because he says he will be with a patient and
 the wife because of feigned modesty. In fact, unbeknown to each other they
 both attend the ball, the doctor beneath a cowl and domino, the wife dressed as
 Pierrot. Fascinated by the Pierrot, the doctor 
is
 startled to hear it give a cough  
and an “ahem” very much like that of his wife. When the Pierrot scratches “its”
 thigh, “with a free and uninhibited gesture,” the doctor says in relief, “It’s not
 her.” In fact it is, and this is confirmed for the doctor when the Pierrot brings
 forth an antique snuffbox he recognizes as his wife’s. Convinced that she 
is there for a rendezvous with another man, the doctor has his own duplicity
 turned back on him, and he follows the Pierrot to see
 
whom she is meeting. In  
the process he is awakened to a new sense of
 
his wife’s free expression of her  
sexuality by the way she rolls her hips, lets men embrace her in the crowd, and
 even herself fondles the breasts of another woman. Finally, the doctor is sure
 that she is not waiting for anyone in particular but was “tasting only the mon
­strous pleasure of being alone, free, honest in her native brutality, of being the
 one who is unknown, forever solitary and without shame, whom a little mask
 and a hermetic costume had restored ... to her irremediable solitude and her
 immodest innocence” (235-6).
The “hidden woman” of the title is both the wife the doctor knows beneath
 
her disguise and the “brutally” free woman the disguise allows her to be.
 Woman’s position as “object” in the doctor’s joke 
is
 doubly overdetermined, and  
though he is startled by her mastery, he reassures himself that she will wear
 
her ­
self out and go home. The doctor, having knowledge of
 
her Otherness while  
she remains unaware of his voyeurism, is not, in his mind, made an object in the
 joking chain at all.
Yet this is only one side of the double-edged joke. In fact, the end of the
 
story, its “punch line,” lifts the doctors inhibitions regarding his wife’s unre
­strained desire and turns the reader back to the beginning of the story, to the
 wife's own lie: namely, the inhibitions she constructs against attending the ball
 alone. These inhibitions are themselves offered as a posed resistance to her
 husband’s pretense of granting her freedom. She constructs, with her lie, a text
 of herself that the husband 
is
 willing to accept as “really” her. In fact, Irene’s  
construction of these inhibitions effectively places her in the first-person posi
­tion on the joking/textual chain. This is, then, a joke that the doctor cannot
 “get,” for his wife ever remains the “one who is unknown” to him. As the
 “shameless woman” she destroys the very base from which the male-told
 obscene joke is constructed. Thus, the “hidden woman,” the absence or blind
 spot in the joke paradigm, surfaces as a subject who retells the joke as one in
 which man’s own devices for objectifying woman become the instruments of his
 undoing and result in his ultimate failure to “know” his woman.
Virginia Woolf’s “Nurse Lugton’s Curtain” (154-5) is another short-short
 
story that “exposes” objectified woman as the butt of the joke and in so doing
 offers a revision of the joke paradigm that stresses the authority of woman’s
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subject position. As “Nurse,” wakeful Lugton 
is
 “phallic” woman, the “ogress”  
in charge “with a face like the side of a mountain with great precipices and
 avalanches, and chasms for her eyes and hair and nose and teeth.” But once
 asleep, the wild beasts portrayed in the fabric of the curtain she is stitching
 romp across her lap, the maternal site of playfulness and birth. On coming back
 to wakefulness and regaining her “phallic” position, she restores the carnival
 scene of the curtain to fixity and “normalcy.” At this moment of closure, Nurse
 Lugton returns to her phallic position of authority as it rules by tyranny, an
 authority that terrifies the children in her charge and illustrates the
 
way women  
are forced to use male forms of power in order to rule.
The “Otherness” and alternative view of feminine forms of power repre
­
sented by Lugton’s dreamworld and the fantastic lap scene coincide with Adri
­enne Rich’s portrayal of
 
female authority in “Aunt  Jennifer’s Tigers.” In both  
cases, needlework — a form of creative power traditionally allowed to women
 — becomes the occasion for the release of repressed desire. But Woolf’s story
 rewrites the joke of totalizing repression to create a fanciful vision in which
 Nurse Lugton represents herself the repressive force that in its turn must be
 tamed, lulled to sleep, in order
 
for  pleasure and freedom to surface and have life.
While the joke appears to be made at
 
the expense of Nurse Lugton, Woolf’s  
rhetorical strategies reveal another twist on the position of woman as object in
 the joke paradigm. By combining the motif of the sleeping ogress with the
 imagery of an enchanted animal world, and by shifting from third- to second-
 person narration once the Nurse falls asleep and the animal kingdom comes to
 life, Woolf enables the reader to account for the story “logically” as the Nurse’s
 dream. That the enchantment may be dreamt by Nurse Lugton, yet she herself
 may be unaware upon waking, coincides with Freud’s theory of the forgetting
 of dreams as evidence of psychical censorship (Interpretation 555). Nurse Lug
­ton’s “objectified” position as the waking force of repression perhaps causes her
 to “forget” her natural state of emancipation,
 
but by means of the rhetoric of the  
story, the reader “gets” the punch line and in so doing frees Nurse Lugton from
 the mantle of her own repressive authority.
Both Woolf’s and Colette’s short-shorts, considered in terms of the joke
 
paradigm, can be read as “exposures” of woman, who from the position of object
 can achieve a subject position in the joking chain. The stories cleverly make use
 of the rhetorical strategies of the joke-work in order to make the male construct
 of “woman” the butt of the joke. In order for woman to achieve authority she
 must not only endure but also embrace the pain to which her male-defined
 position subjects her. This is a lesson that can be appropriated by all minori
­ties who find themselves “butted” out of the joking/textual chain, made objects
 of the none-too-funny joke of cultural dominance, oppression, and imposed
 silence.
4.




both of Freud’s model of the subject positions at stake in the joke  
and of Deleuze and Guattari’s account of deterritorialization as a defining ele-
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ment of minor literature, reveals similarities between the two genres that
 
enhance and reinforce their narrative complexity. If, as Freud has said, the
 function of the
 
joke is to protect words and thoughts from criticism, then per ­
haps the "protective coloring” of the short story 
as
 a "minor”  genre is in fact part  
of its strength. Its status as a minor genre has thus far safeguarded it from the
 more voracious critical beasts roaming the narrative jungle in search of meatier
 game such 
as
 the novel. As a genre that, according to Georg Lukacs, "sees  
absurdity in all its undisguised and unadorned nakedness” (51-2), the short
 story as a "minor” form has resisted reappropriation and reterritorialization. In
 this way it has managed to preserve itself 
as
 a narrative haven against the total ­
izing and territorializing operations required of a major literature.
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